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TRIBAL BUSINESSES AND THE UNCERTAIN
REACH OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY:
A STATUTORY SOLUTION
AbstracL The effect of tribal sovereign immunity on business transactions is difficult to
predict, despite the doctrine's often dramatic importance. Unlike the sovereign immuni-
ties of state, federal, and foreign governments, the scope of tribal immunity is not defined
by statute. Some courts have applied the doctrine in a manner that is contrary to federal
Indian law and policy. The resulting unpredictability hampers tribal economic develop-
ment. This Comment proposes a federal tribal immunity statute that would affirm the
general principles of the common law and explicitly immunize all entirely tribal-owned
enterprises whether operating on- or off-reservation.
The frequency and importance of business relationships involving
Indian tribes are increasing as tribal lands and resources become more
valuable in the marketplace.1 Parties inevitably encounter disputes in
these relationships that necessitate resort to state or federal courts for
resolution.2 Frequently both tribal and outside counsel must address
the extent to which tribal immunity from suit may bar such actions
Predicting the effect of tribal immunity on a particular transaction
is no simple matter. The classic statement of the tribal immunity doc-
trine, that all suits against tribes are barred absent congressional or
tribal consent, belies the complexity of the rule.4 Only partially in jest,
the editors of a widely used casebook caution that "[t]he nuances of
tribal sovereign immunity... are recommended only for the brave."'
Two recent state court decisions add to the uncertain scope of tribalimmunity.6 In Dixon v. Picopa Construction Co.,7 the Arizona
1. See, eg., Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Feb. 6, 1991, at BI, col. 2 (Puyallup Tribe joins with
waste management firm to propose a solution to Pierce County's garbage disposal dilemma).
2. This Comment only considers issues of tribal immunity from private suit in state or federal
courts. Tribes may also enjoy sovereign immunity in their own courts. See generally Johnson &
Madden, Sovereign Immunity in Indian Tribal Law, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 153 (1984).
3. Throughout this Comment, "tribe" or "tribal" refers to an Indian government. A
discussion of whether a particular group of Indians constitutes a tribe is beyond the scope of this
Comment. For a discussion of which Indian groups constitute tribes for purposes of tribal
immunity, see generally Bottomly v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 599 F.2d 1061 (1st Cir. 1979);
Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977).
"Sovereign immunity" refers in a general sense to the doctrine of governmental immunity
from civil suit. "Tribal immunity" specifically means the tribe's immunity from private civil suit.
4. Eg., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978).
5. D. GETcHtES & C. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 315
(2d ed. 1986).
6. "Scope" as used throughout this Comment refers to the coverage of tribal immunity. The
doctrine's "scope" determines which entities and activities may potentially claim the tribal
immunity defense.
7. 160 Ariz. 251, 772 P.2d 1104 (1989).
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Supreme Court ignored principles of tribal sovereignty and self-deter-
mination to hold an entirely tribal-owned construction company sub-
ject to unconsented suit. In Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma,8 the New
Mexico Supreme Court mischaracterized tribal sovereignty and Con-
gress' plenary power over Indian affairs in holding a tribal entity
amenable to suit for its off-reservation activity. These cases contradict
fundamental principles of federal Indian law and policy. Such erratic
application of the tribal immunity doctrine may also discourage tribal
economic development.9
This Comment suggests that federal Indian policies would be fur-
thered by a statutory affirmation of the general principles of tribal
immunity and proposes bright-line provisions for the statute. Part I
examines the doctrinal basis of tribal immunity in federal law and
sketches its parameters. Part II examines the reasoning of Dixon and
Padilla and shows how these decisions compromise federal Indian law
and policy. Part III proposes a comprehensive tribal immunity statute
to solve problems arising from erratic decisions like Dixon and Padilla.
This Comment concludes that tribal immunity should apply to any
entirely tribal-owned enterprise and should protect off-reservation as
well as on-reservation activity.
I. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
The sovereign immunities of state, federal, foreign, and tribal gov-
ernments share a common law origin.10 Although statutes have
largely supplanted the common law in defining most sovereign immu-
nities no statute delineates tribal immunity. Accordingly, analysis of
tribal immunity problems requires careful reasoning from fundamen-
tal principles of federal Indian law and policy.
A. Tribal Immunity from Suit
Under common law, sovereigns are immune from private civil suit
both in their own courts and in the courts of another sovereign."
8. 107 N.M. 174, 754 P.2d 845 (1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1029 (1989).
9. Most tribes are "clearly underdeveloped by almost any definition." Pommersheim,
Economic Development in Indian Country: What Are the Questions?, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REv.
195, 196 (1984). Discussion of the numerous, sometimes undesirable, consequences of economic
development is far beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally Vinje, Cultural Values and
Economic Development on Reservations in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 155 (V. Deloria, Jr. ed. 1985).
10. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978).
11. See, e-g., E. CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 470-72 (1989). The immunity of
states from suits in federal court by individuals is guaranteed by the eleventh amendment to the
United States Constitution.
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Although the justification for the doctrine has often been unclear,
American courts consistently have held state, federal, and foreign gov-
ernments immune from unconsented suit.1 2 Similarly, sovereign tribes
"have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity
from suit.""3
Congress has provided guidelines for delineating the immunities of
most sovereigns in federal courts.1 4 Implicit in these statutes is a con-
gressional affirmation of the general principles of sovereign immunity.
The statutes define the scope of sovereign immunity and precisely
identify the limited terms under which sovereigns may be sued. No
statute comprehensively delineates tribal immunity or defines the
terms under which tribes may be sued. Congress has generally voiced
support for the doctrine.1" But the scope and terms of tribal immunity
remain almost entirely a product of the common law.
Tribal immunity's fundamental precepts, however, are settled. Tri-
bal immunity bars courts from hearing any action against an Indian
tribe without tribal or congressional consent. 6 The doctrine fore-
12. Id. at 470-73. To ameliorate the perceived injustices of strict application of sovereign
immunity, courts carved out an exception allowing suits against officers. See Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949) (federal officers); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908) (state officers).
A discussion of the important "officer suit" exception to sovereign immunity is beyond the
scope of this Comment. See generally Comment, Sovereign Immunity, the Officer Suit Fiction,
and Entitlement Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 295 (1989).
13. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58. As early as 1895, courts recognized that tribes were
immune from suit absent congressional consent. See Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F.
372 (8th Cir. 1895).
The Supreme Court first acknowledged tribal immunity in Turner v. United States, 248 U.S.
354 (1919). However, Turner was decided on the basis that no sovereign is responsible for the
mob action of its citizens and so the Court did not extensively address the Tribe's immunity. Id.
at 357-58.
14. For example, the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Tucker Act waive federal sovereign
immunity for limited classes of claims against the government. See generally E. CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 11, at 475-88 (discussing scope and application of these statutes).
Other legislation permits actions against federal, state, and foreign governments. See 5
U.S.C.A. § 702 (West 1977) (actions for relief other than money damages against federal
agencies or officers); 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (West 1983) (actions against
foreign nations); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1981) (suits against local officials for deprivation of
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws").
15. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 450n (West 1983); see also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 111 S. Ct. 905, 910 (1991) ("Congress has consistently reiterated its
approval of the immunity doctrine.").
Congress also has abrogated tribal immunity in a few instances. See infra notes 89-90.
16. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58. Sovereign immunity issues also may arise when
the United States, as trustee for tribal property, must be joined in a suit. Waiver of the United
States' sovereign immunity generally does not bind the tribes. See Big Spring v. United States
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 767 F.2d 614, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1181
(1986).
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closes subject matter jurisdiction. 7 Thus, the merits of a suit against a
tribe, no matter how compelling, cannot be heard,.' Tribal officers
acting as individuals or outside their authority may, however, be
sued.' 9 Tribes can bring suits in federal or state courts.20 The tribe
necessarily consents to a possible adverse judgment, but a tribal law-
suit does not indicate consent to permissive or compulsory counter-
claims or crossclaims. 2'
B. The Doctrinal Underpinnings of Tribal Immunity
Three doctrines unique to federal Indian law-tribal sovereignty,
self-determination, and congressional plenary power-largely shape
the contours of common law tribal immunifty. For various reasons the
validity of these doctrines is increasingly questioned. The Supreme
Court, however, still purports to decide Indian cases on such princi-
ples.22 The doctrines are key to resolving discrepancies that have
arisen over the proper scope of tribal immunity.
L The Sovereignty of Indian Tribes
Inherent sovereignty provides the foundation for the exercise of all
tribal power. Sovereignty is the basis of tribal immunity from suit.
The Supreme Court understands tribal immunity as a "necessary
17. Eg., Big Spring, 767 F.2d at 617. Accordingly, immunity may be raised in a collateral
attack, e.g., United States v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940),
and should be raised by judges on their own initiative. Eg., Big Spring, 767 F.2d at 617.
18. Tribal immunity bars damage claims, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guarantee, 309 U.S. at
506; mandamus, e.g., Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977);
injunctions, e.g., Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1985); and
suits for declaratory relief, e.g., California v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.
1979).
19. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59. Although tribal officers are not protected by tribal
immunity, the exception is less important than for state or federal officials. This is because while
tribal officers are subject to suit under some of the same circumstances as their federal or state
counterparts, when acting outside statutory authority, F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDiAN LAW 328 (R. Strickland & C. Wilkinson eds. 1982), they are not subject to suit for
violating constitutional provisions limiting federal or state power. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376 (1896).
20. See F. COHEN, supra note 19, at 316-18 (discussing various jurdictional statutes relating
to Indian tribes).
21. See United States Fidelity & Guarantee, 309 U.S. at 512-13; see also United States v.
Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1014-16 (9th Cir. 1981), for a discussion of the effect of tribal
intervention in litigation.
22. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 419 (1989). Some scholars, however, contend that Supreme Court Indian law decisions are
largely ad hoc, even confused and inconsistent. See Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical
Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1137, 1204 (1990).
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corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance."23 Immunity
from suit in federal or state courts furthers tribal sovereignty and self-
determination by preventing the interference of an outside sovereign
and insulating limited tribal treasuries from the burdens of defending
suits and paying judgments.24
Retained tribal powers flow from an original sovereignty, and are
not derived from federal authority.2" The sovereignty of American
tribes exists outside the federal Constitution.26 Initially the colonies,
and later the federal government, recognized tribal sovereignty in
numerous treaties of peace and cooperation. In return for land and
the tribes' help in defending the infant federal government from
European powers, the United States promised to protect tribal
sovereignty. 27
The Supreme Court recognized the Indian tribes' unique political
status in two cases involving the Cherokee Nation. In Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia,2" Chief Justice Marshall observed that the relation-
ship of the Indians "to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any
other two people in existence."29 On the one hand, the Tribe was "a
distinct political society... capable of managing its own affairs and
governing itself."30 Yet on the other, Cherokee territory was within
United States boundaries, so the Tribe lacked the geographic separa-
tion characteristic of nation-states. Indian tribes, Marshall noted,
were specifically mentioned, apart from states or foreign nations, in
the commerce clause of the Constitution.3 Finally, treaty language
guaranteeing federal protection for the tribe connoted a relationship
unlike typical international affiliations.32 Recognizing these "peculiar
and cardinal distinctions," Marshall characterized the Cherokee as a
"domestic dependent" nation. 3
23. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986).
24. Eg., American Indian Agric. Credit Consortium v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d
1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1985).
25. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978).
26. I L
27. F. CoHEN, supra note 19, at 234. For this Comment, sovereignty is defined as "the self-
sufficient source of political power, from which all specific political powers are derived."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979).
28. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
29. Id. at 16.
30. Id
31. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
32. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
33. Id at 16, 17.
117
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One year later, in Worcester v. Georgia,34 Marshall elaborated on his
vision of tribal sovereignty within a constitutional democracy. Draw-
ing from international law, the Chief Justice analogized tribes to
nation-states.35 Prior to the European colonization of America, tribes
were full sovereigns. 36 After conquest or treaty the tribes became sub-
ject to the legislative power of the United States. By virtue of United
States' dominance, external aspects of tribal sovereignty, such as
foreign relations, were necessarily extinguished.37 Nonetheless, in
Marshall's view tribes remained "distinct, independent, political
communities.
' 31
Tribal sovereignty is, however, not as powerful as Worcester seems
to indicate.39 Current Supreme Court doctrine holds that any incident
of tribal sovereignty can be abridged or destroyed by Congress.'
Tribes, however, retain all aspects of sovereignty not expressly limited
by treaty, agreement, federal legislation or Supreme Court decision.41
Modern tribes have broad and varied sovereign powers. Tribes
exercise their sovereign authority when operating court systems, police
departments, schools, housing authorities, water management agencies
and collecting taxes.42 Tribal development of economic opportunities
also is an exercise of sovereign power.43 Indeed, meaningful tribal sov-
ereignty hardly is possible without economic self-sufficiency.' Pro-
viding jobs and developing economic resources may be the most
important of a modern tribe's governmental functions.45 To this end
tribes conduct job training programs, encourage outside investment,
lease tribal resources, and tax Indian and non-Indian businesses within
reservation boundaries. Tribes also may form joint ventures, charter
private corporations (both Indian and non-Indian owned) or operate
their own diverse businesses.'
34. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
35. Id. at 559-60.
36. Id. at 542-43.
37. See id at 560-61.
38. Id. at 559.
39. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 149 (1973) (Worcester "has given way
to more individualized treatment of particular treaties and specific federal statutes [to determine]
the respective rights of States, Indians, and the Federal Government.").
40. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
41. Id.
42. See AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., INDIAN TRIBES AS
SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS 33--60 (1988).
43. Id. at 58-59. Tribal governments often are the only entitis capable of developing
community resources. Ia
44. See California v. Cabezon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216-19 (1987).
45. K. FAY, DEVELOPING INDIAN EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 4 (1976).
46. AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., supra note 42, at 58-59.
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Two pressing problems in tribal immunity analysis largely turn on
conceptions (or misconceptions) of tribal sovereignty. The first of
these involves determining whether a particular entity is "tribal" and
thus entitled to immunity.4 7 The second problem concerns whether
tribal immunity should extend to off-reservation activity.
Until recently, courts defined "tribal entity" expansively and con-
sistently.48 Tribal immunity certainly applies to traditional tribal
agencies.49 It is less clear, however, whether such entities as tribal-
chartered corporations or joint ventures,50 may be immune from
suit.51 Until recently it appeared that tribes had the power to confer
immunity on their wholly-owned corporations. 2 In Dixon v. Picopa
Construction Co.,53 the Arizona Supreme Court, however, introduced
uncertainty into tribal immunity by holding a tribal-owned construc-
tion corporation subject to unconsented suit.
The Arizona Supreme Court held in Dixon that the tribal-chartered
and wholly-owned construction corporation was not entitled to immu-
nity in a tort suit arising from a truck accident.5 4 The Dixon court
reasoned that the following factors indicated that the construction
company was not part of the tribe and thus could not raise the tribalimmunity defense. First, the company was a corporation.55 Second,
the company had a board of directors separate from the tribal govern-
ment. 6 Third, the corporation had purchased liability insurance.57
Fourth, the tribal ordinance that formed the company lacked an
express statement that the company was formed to advance a tribal
47. See F. COHEN, supra note 19, at 327.
48. Sea eg., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir.)
(tribal proprietary actions deserve immunity), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 918 (1966); Morgan v.
Colorado River Indian Tribe, 103 Ariz. 425, 443 P.2d 421 (1968) (tribal immunity bars tort
action against tribal-owned marina).
49. Eg., Weeks Constr., Inc., v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1986).
50. For this Comment "joint venture" is defined as an enterprise with partial tribal
ownership. "Private" refers to an enterprise in which the tribe has no investment. "Tribal-
owned" or "wholly-owned" refers to an entity, in which 100% of the shares are owned by the
tribe. Distinction must be made between corporations that are "tribal-owned" and those that are
"tribal-chartered." Tribes, like states, may also charter private corporations.
51. See F. COHEN, supra note 19, at 327.
52. See, ag., Fontenelle v. Omaha Tribe, 430 F.2d 143, 147 (8th Cir. 1970). Presumably
corporate liability would be limited to capital. Nonetheless a suit against a tribal-owned
corporation threatens the value of shares held by the tribal treasury.
53. 160 Ariz. 251, 772 P.2d 1104 (1989).
54. 772 P.2d at 1112.
55. Id. at 1111.
56. Id. at 1109.
57. I. at 1109-10.
119
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purpose.5" The Dixon court concluded that the corporation was sepa-
rate from the tribe and not entitled to immunity.
A second problem, which also implicates conceptions of sover-
eignty, is the definition of tribal immunity's geographical limit.5 9 Sev-
eral courts have recognized tribal immunity for off-reservation
activity.' Importantly, no federal court has yet limited tribal immu-
nity to reservation boundaries.61
The New Mexico Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of off-
reservation immunity. In Padilla v. Pueblo ofAcoma62 a roofing con-
sultant sued a Pueblo-owned construction company for breach of con-
tract. The Padilla court, drawing an analogy to Nevada v. Hall,63
denied tribal immunity for the company's off-reservation activity."4
Under Padilla, contrary to the previous holdings, off-reservation tribal
58. Id at 1110.
59. See Pueblo of Acoma v. Padilla, 490 U.S. 1029 (1989) (only White, J., voted to grant
certiorari to resolve the discrepancy over off-reservation immunity).
60. See, eg., Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1977)
(state courts do not have jurisdiction over tribe either on- or off-reservation); Morgan v.
Colorado River Indian Tribe, 103 Ariz. 425, 443 P.2d 421 (1968) (off-reservation tribal marina
can raise immunity defense in tort action); North Sea Prods. Ltd. v. Clipper Seafoods, 92 Wash.
2d 236, 241-42, 595 P.2d 938 (1979) (off-reservation activity does not implicitly waive
immunity).
61. The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 111 S. Ct. 905 (1991). Oklahoma demanded $2.7 million for
cigarette taxes that had accrued on sales to nonmembers at the Tribe's convenience store. The
Tribe invoked its sovereign immunity and moved for dismissal of the state's counterclaim. A
unanimous Court held that although states could tax tribal cigarette sales to nonmembers, tribal
immunity barred state suits to force collection of the tax. Id. at 910. As a result the Tribe was
obliged to collect the tax, but the state was foreclosed from enforcing the obligation in the most
efficient manner available, a suit in state court. Id Although the Oklahoma Tax Commission
Court did not explicitly limit tribal immunity to reservation activities, the Court's opinion
suggests that it may sympathize with such state arguments. Oklahoma argued that tribal
immunity did not cover cigarette sales occurring on land not formally part of the Tribe's
reservation. Id, at 910. Instead of pointedly declaring that tribal immunity protected off-
reservation activity, the Court found that the tribal convenience store was, in effect, on the
reservation.
62. 107 N.M. 174, 754 P.2d 845 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1029 (1989).
63. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
64. 754 P.2d at 850-51. The Padilla court found that, unlike the situation in Dixon, the
company was part of the tribe and potentially subject to immunity. Id. at 849. The only issue in
Padilla was whether tribal immunity covered off-reservation activity.
In Hall the Supreme Court held that the eleventh amendment did not bar California from
entering a tort judgment against the state of Nevada arising from a Nevada employee's car
accident on a California road. 440 U.S. at 421-22. The Supreme Court held that one state's
immunity in the courts of another state was solely a matter of comity between the states. Id at
426. The eleventh amendment did not require California to frustrate its policy of full
compensation for government tort victims. Id
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immunity is left to the discretion of the state and may be abridged to
further state policy.65
2. Tribal Self-Determination
A second factor important to tribal immunity analysis is the federal
policy of tribal self-determination. Self-determination complements
tribal sovereignty.66 The concept refers to two interdependent
notions. Self-determination means that Indian problems are best
addressed by Indian solutions and that tribal governments are compe-
tent to solve such problems.
Several statutes promote self-determination by recognizing tribes as
basic governmental entities capable of providing essential services and
making decisions regarding the well-being of their constituents. 67
Among the most important of these is the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934 (IRA).6 8 A fundamental objective of the IRA was to transfer
control of Indian affairs from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the tribes
themselves.69 To accomplish this goal, the IRA provided for two sep-
arate tribal units; a constitutional government to exercise preexisting
sovereign powers, and a corporation for conducting tribal business. 70
Consistent with self-determination, the tribes themselves decided by
65. Fadilla, 754 P.2d at 850; see also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, Ill S. Ct. at 912 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("I am not sure that the rule of tribal sovereign immunity extends to cases arising
from a tribe's conduct of commercial activity outside its own territory.").
66. See, eg., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978); see also Seattle Times,
June 30, 1991, at Al, col. 1, A4, col. 1 (quoting President Bush's statement that "lt]oday we
move forward toward a permanent relationship of understanding and trust, a relationship in
which the tribes of the nation sit in positions of sovereignty along with the other governments
that compose the family that is America"). Federal policies have vacillated between encouraging
assimilation on the one hand and promoting self-determination on the other. See generally F.
COHEN, supra note 19, at 47-206 (discussing the history of federal Indian policy).
67. See, eg., The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDEA),
25 U.S.C.A. §§ 450a-450n (West 1983 & Supp. 1990). The ISDEA encourages meaningful
tribal sovereignty through "effective ... participation by the Indian people in the planning,
conduct, and administration of [federal] programs and services." Id § 450a. The ISDEA allows
the Secretary of the Interior to contract with tribal organizations to administer service and
benefit programs previously administered by the Secretary. Id § 450f. The Indian Civil Rights
Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-41 (West 1983) validates tribal powers by placing tribes in a position
of responsibility and accountability similar to that of the federal, state, and local governments.
F. COHEN, supra note 19, at 204.
68. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 461-79 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
69. Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH.
L. REv. 955, 966 (1972). However, many tribes believed the IRA merely continued prior
assimilative polices by imposing non-Indian government structures on the tribes. See F. COHEN,
supra note 19, at 147-48.
70. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 474-76 (West 1983).
Washington Law Review Vol. 67:113, 1992
popular vote whether to organize under the IRA.7 1 "Self-determina-
tion statutes" like the IRA recognize and promote sovereignty by
allowing tribes to effectively exercise their inherent powers.
Tribes can waive their immunity in state or federal courts in accord
with self-determination and as part of inherent sovereignty.72 Tribal
waivers are analyzed under a two-step analysis. First, the tribal entity
must have authority to waive immunity.73 Second, tribal waivers must
be explicit and are strictly construed.74 Despite these rigorous stan-
dards, courts have recognized tribal waivers through involvement in
lawsuits,75 contract clauses,76 corporate charters,77 ordinances,78 per-
sonnel manuals, and tribal constitutions.79
3. Congressional Plenary Power Over Tribes
Apart from the tribes themselves, only Congress may modify or dis-
pense with tribal immunity. 0 Congressional power over Indian affairs
is often described as plenary."1 Plenary power does not imply absolute
congressional dominion over the tribes.82 Instead, plenary power
71. Id. § 476. For example, the largest tribe, the Navajos, opted away from the IRA
structure. See D. GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, supra note 5, at 126.
72. United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 1981). Tribes cannot waive their
immunity by contract with regard to property held in trust by the federal government without
federal approval. See F. COHEN, supra note 19, at 325.
73. See, eg., Namekagon Dev. Co. v. Bois Forte Reservation Hous. Auth., 517 F.2d 508, 510
(8th Cir. 1975). In the case of tribal agencies, waiver authority might come from the charter or
ordinance creating the entity. Id.
74. See ag., Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 315,
319-20 (10th Cir. 1982) (attorney's fee clause, third party loan agreement, and assurance that
contract was "valid and legally binding obligation upon parties," were not explicit waivers of
immunity).
75. MeClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1989) (waiver only extends to
possible adverse judgment on tribe's claim).
76. E.g., Namekagon Dev. Co., 517 F.2d at 510 (provision that federal funds will be available
to effect payment and performance).
77. E.g., Rosebud Sioux v. A & P Steel, Inc., 874 F.2d 550, 552 (8th Cir. 1989). General
waivers of corporate immunity do not affect the immunity of the tribal governing body. Boe v.
Fort Belknap Indian Community, 455 F. Supp. 462, 463-64 (D. Mcnt. 1978), aff'd, 642 F.2d
276 (9th Cir. 1981).
78. E.g., Weeks Constr., Inc., v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.' 2d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 1986)
("sue and be sued" clause in ordinance creating housing authority).
79. Cf Johnson & Madden, supra note 2, at 163--64.
80. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978).
81. Eg., i d at 57. Congressional power over Indian affairs has been ascribed to an amalgam
of sources. F. COHEN, supra note 19, at 211. Modern theories trace the constitutional bases of
congressional power to the Indian commerce clause, the treaty clause and the supremacy clause.
Id
82. F. COHEN, supra note 19, at 217. No federal statute directed at Indians has been struck
down on the grounds that Congress exceeded its authority over Indian affairs. See C.
WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS TIME AND THE LAW 82 (198T. This might imply that
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means that Congress has authority over all issues relating to Indian
affairs. Congressional plenary power also precludes the states from
extinguishing any aspect of inherent tribal sovereignty. 3
A trust relationship, which places Congress as guardian and the
tribes as wards, somewhat ameliorates the potential harshness of ple-
nary power. The trust concept can be traced to the Supreme Court's
decision in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia."4 Chief Justice Marshall
found that a relationship, like that of guardian to its ward, arose from
treaties in which the United States guaranteed the tribes' continued
existence as distinct political communities. 5 In addition to imposing
a fiduciary duty, the trust responsibility requires the federal govern-
ment to protect tribal government and insulate it from state
interference.86
Canons of construction important to the interpretation of the tribal
immunity doctrine arise from the trust relationship. 7 Because Con-
gress is presumed to act in the tribes' best interest, courts must read
federal statutes as protecting Indian rights. Tribal immunity is part of
tribal sovereignty, thus courts must narrowly construe statutes that
arguably infringe upon this right.8 8
Accordingly, while Congress' plenary power allows it to abrogate
tribal immunity for any cause of action in state or federal courts, 9
Congress must express such waivers clearly and courts must construe
them narrowly.' Courts steadfastly refuse to read implied waivers of
tribal immunity into federal statutes.91 A congressional waiver does
not create subject matter jurisdiction; a separate statute authorizing
congressional authority over tribes is, indeed, absolute. On the other hand, critics of the
Supreme Court's Indian law decisions note that there is no constitutional grant of such a broad
power. See Frickey, supra note 22, at 1205.
83. Graves v. White Mountain Apache Indian Tribe, 117 Ariz. 32, 570 P.2d 803 (Ct. App.
1977) (Congress, not state court, should determine if tribal immunity is appropriate or
advisable), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 931 (1978).
84. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
85. Id. at 17.
86. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 19, at 221-25 (discussing the nature of the federal
trust responsibility).
87. Id at 221-22.
88. See id. at 224; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1978).
89. Eg., Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 538, 26 Stat. 851. Congressional waivers of tribal
immunity should be distinguished from waivers of the United States' own sovereign immunity.
90. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59-60.
91. See id. at 60; Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 892 (1986) (Public Law
280 does not waive immunity). General federal jurisdictional statutes do not waive tribal
immunity. Ziontz, In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An Analysis of Judicial Error in Construction
of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 20 S.D.L. REv. 1, 30 (1975).
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jurisdiction is required.92 Waivers merely permit suits in forums
otherwise able to hear them.93
II. THE UNCERTAIN REACH OF TRIBAL ]IMMUNITY
FOR TRIBAL BUSINESSES
The two cases highlighted in Part I, Dixon v. Picopa Construction
Co.,94 and Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma,9' introduce significant uncer-
tainty into tribal immunity analysis. If the cases herald a jurispruden-
tial trend, tribal businesses should recalculate their potential liability.
Although this Part concludes that these cases contradict fundamental
principles of federal Indian law, the possibility of similar poorly rea-
soned holdings makes it difficult to predict the effect of tribal immu-
nity on business transactions. This uncertainty threatens tribal
economic prosperity and survival.
A. Dixon v. Picopa Construction Co. and Tribal Entities
The Arizona Supreme Court in Dixon addressed the issue of which
characteristics define a tribal entity and therefore what entities are
capable of claiming immunity. The court balanced several factors to
hold a tribal-owned corporation not a tribal entity and thus amenable
to unconsented suit without the protection of immunity.9 6 The prob-
lem with the Dixon holding is that it conditioned tribal immunity on
the tribe's adherence to a state court's vision of art appropriate tribal
governmental structure. Under Dixon the tribe was forced to choose
between tribal corporations and tribal immunity from suit.
The Dixon holding inappropriately infringes upon tribal sover-
eignty. The power to form tribal-owned corporations, like immunity
from suit, is an element of tribal sovereignty. Respect for sovereignty
dictates that tribes should be free to structure gove:mment and accom-
plish governmental policies through any organizational means, includ-
ing the use of tribal-owned corporations. Tribes should not be forced
to sacrifice the option of forming tribal corporations in order to keep
92. See Ziontz, supra note 91, at 21-22.
93. Weeks Constr., Inc., v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 1986).
* 94. 160 Ariz. 251, 772 P.2d 1104 (1989).
95. 107 N.M. 174, 754 P.2d 845 (1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1029 (1989).
96. 772 P.2d at 1107-10. Although the Dixon court considered several factors, the outcome
of each was determined by the Tribe's decision to use a corporation, rather than a more
"traditional" agency, as its preferred vehicle. See id. at 1111 (corporation is an "artificial
individual" and therefore not entitled to assert the tribal immunity defense). For instance, the
court concluded that the corporation's board of directors, although elected by the Tribe, was too
far removed from tribal control. Id. at 1107.
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tribal immunity.97  Tribal discretion in forming governments is con-
fined only by the tribal constitution-not by state or federal courts."
Indeed, tribal power to choose the form of its subordinate government
entities "is the first element of sovereignty."99
Tribal self-determination policies also support the formation of
wholly-owned corporations without waiving immunity.I°° Tribes may
face problems of poverty, unemployment, and inadequate health care
on a scale largely unfamiliar to their state or federal counterparts. 1
Tribes confront these problems from unique legal, economic, histori-
cal, philosophical, and religious perspectives.' 0 2 Self-determination
requires that those most familiar with such predicaments-the tribes
themselves-be free to decide the form of government to solve the
problems.103 The choice to attack a problem with a tribal corporation
or with an agency should be left entirely to the tribes' discretion.
A rule such as Dixon's that limits tribal immunity to certain entities
inappropriately limits tribal options. The better rule is the generally
accepted principle that tribal-owned corporations possess the tribe's
immunity and enjoy it until voluntarily waived." 4
B. Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma and Off-Reservation Activity
Off-reservation immunity is particularly susceptible to attack by
states because tribal off-reservation activity is likely to impact non-
97. See Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926) (action against vessel of
state-owned commercial shipping corporation dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds); cf
Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355 (1966) (Red Cross, as a federal
instrumentality, was immune from state taxation); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819) (corporation is merely the means by which governmental objectives are
accomplished); F. COHEN, supra note 19, at 359 (tribal government should not be forced either to
supply a remedy against individual Indians or forfeit its governmental authority).
98. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978); F. COHEN, supra note 19,
at 247.
99. F. COHEN, supra note 19, at 247.
100. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
101. See Pommersheim, supra note 9, at 195, 204 (citing 1980 census figures showing that
annual per capita income for the eight largest tribes in South Dakota ranged from $2,166 to
$2,801; unemployment averaged 44%).
102. See generally ld at 202-05 (discussing various institutional impediments to economic
development in the tribal context).
103. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text; Ziontz, supra note 91, at 48-51
(discussing danger of ethnocentrism when non-Indian institutions decide Indian matters); see
also Vinje, supra note 9, at 155.
Vinje presents a case study of development plans of three tribes. Each plan adopts a
dramatically different approach to the basic problem of increasing the economic well-being of
tribal members. Id at 161-67. Differences between the plans reflect differences between the
tribes' geographical locations, cultural values, and social needs. Id
104. See, ag., Fontenelle v. Omaha Tribe, 430 F.2d 143, 147 (8th Cir. 1970).
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Indian state citizens."°5 States contend that immunizing off-reserva-
tion tribal activity frustrates legitimate state polices. 10 6 These argu-
ments ignore the fact that tribes are sovereigns with rights that can be
infringed only by Congress.
As an element of sovereignty, off-reservation immunity can be extin-
guished only by the tribes or by Congress.10 7 Unde:r the common law,
the location of an activity did not affect sovereign immunity. 08 Tribes
have not agreed to a wholesale waiver of off-reservation immunity.
Equally important, Congress has not expressly confined tribal immu-
nity to reservation boundaries."°
The court in Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma I" displayed a fundamental
misunderstanding of the source and scope of tribal immunity. Ini-
tially, the Padilla court properly acknowledged that "[a]bsent federal
authorization, tribal immunity is privileged from diminution by the
states."'" Paradoxically, however, the Padilla court concluded that
absent any "provision under the supreme law of the land [prohibiting]
a state's exercise of jurisdiction over sovereign Indian tribes for off-
reservation conduct," New Mexico could assert jurisdiction over the
Tribe." 2 If off-reservation tribal misconduct was immunized, the
Padilla court asserted, New Mexico's policy of allowing its citizens
redress against governmental misconduct would be frustrated."'
The Padilla court's pre-emption analysis is inappropriate."I4 Immu-
nity for off-reservation activity, like any element of inherent tribal soy-
105. See, eg., Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 160 Ariz. 251, 772 P.2d 1104 (1989) (tribal-
owned cement truck injured non-Indian).
106. See Oklahoma Tax Commin v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 111 S. Ct. 905
(1991) (collection of cigarette tax); Padilia v. Pueblo of Acoma, 107 N.M. 174, 754 P.2d 845
(1988) (damages for breach of contract), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1029 (1989).
107. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
108. See, eg., The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (the
Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over a warship of the French Emperor Napoleon seized in
the Port of Philadelphia); see also 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-11 (West 1973); supra
notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
110. 107 N.M. 174, 754 P.2d 845 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1029 (1989).
111. 754 P.2d at 847.
112. Id. at 850.
113. New Mexico had largely abolished sovereign immunity for suits against the state.
Padilla, 754 P.2d at 850-51.
114. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v. State ex reL Thompson, 874 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1989) (pre-
emption test never applied to tribal immunity analysis in federal court). Pre-emption analysis
may be appropriate to determine the proper scope of state and tribal regulatory or taxation
power. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877 (1986). See generally F. COHEN,
supra note 19, at 270-79 (discussing interplay of sovereignty and pre-emption analysis).
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ereignty, persists until waived by a tribe or abrogated by Congress.' 15
Tribal immunity, like tribal sovereignty from which it flows, does not
originate from a federal grant.' 6 Nor does it expire in the face of
federal inaction. Recognition of tribal immunity is not left to the dis-
cretion of the states.' 7 Neither state courts nor state legislatures,
therefore, can divest a tribe of its immunity."' Thus, under the doc-
trines of tribal sovereignty and plenary power, immunity for off-reser-
vation activity continues until explicitly waived by a tribe or abrogated
by Congress.
III. RESOLVING THE AMBIGUITY-A COMPREHENSIVE
TRIBAL IMMUNITY STATUTE
Cases such as Dixon and Padilla are problematic for two reasons;
they compromise tribal sovereignty, and they obscure the true scope of
tribal immunity. Congress should enact a comprehensive federal tri-
bal immunity statute to resolve the problems created by cases like
Dixon and Padilla A federal statute should reaffirm the general prin-
ciples of common law tribal immunity and precisely delineate the doc-
trine's scope. A federal statute should explicitly immunize all entirely
tribal-owned entities for on- or off-reservation activity." 9
A tribal immunity statute would provide the judiciary with explicit
guidance. 2 0 Although the courts developed tribal immunity, they
look to Congress to define its ultimate parameters.' 2 ' A federal statute
would limit judicial discretion and ensure that Congress alone defines
tribal immunity.'22 In light of the constant pressure on tribal sover-
115. The Padilla court drew an analogy to Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). Hall,
however, simply held that no constitutional provision barred California's exercise of jurisdiction
over Nevada. For a discussion of Hall, see supra note 64. Similarly, there is no constitutional
bar to a state's exercise of jurisdiction over a tribe. However, that should not have ended the
Padilla court's inquiry into state power over Indian tribes. Unlike California and Nevada, tribes
and states are not equal sovereigns.
116. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
117. Eg., California v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595 F.2d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 1979).
118. The Padilla court did not recognize that when the state legislature or a state court
abolishes state sovereign immunity, the sovereign is dissolving one of its own privileges. Such is
not the case when state courts divest tribes of tribal immunity.
119. Although this Comment only addresses these two particular provisions, the statute also
should describe the terms, if any, upon which tribes may be sued.
120. Furthermore, a tribal immunity statute would be consistent with similar statutory
definitions of federal and foreign government sovereign immunity. See supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
121. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978) ("[A] proper respect both for
tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area cautions that we
tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent.").
122. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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eignty 123 and the general decline of sovereign immunity in the non-
Indian context,124 it is not surprising that some facets of tribal immu-
nity are continually under pressure. A statute that limits the ability of
states to infringe tribal immunity would also fulfill the federal trust
responsibility because it would block state incursions into tribal
sovereignty. 125
A federal statute, applicable in all jurisdictions, would promote a
uniform and consistent application of tribal immunity that would be
easily predictable. Predictability encourages tribal business by
allowing all parties involved in tribal transactions to better plan for
possible liability. 126
A. The Scope of Statutory Tribal Immunity
The substantive provisions of a tribal immunity statute should
include respect for tribal sovereignty and self-determination.
Lawmakers should balance these considerations With the need for a
predictable rule.
L Any Tribal-Owned Entity Should Be Immune
Various approaches have been suggested for determining which tri-
bal entities may claim tribal immunity. 127 Analytically two decisions
must be made: first, whether to consider a single factor or multiple
factors; second, which factor or factors should define the scope of tri-
bal immunity.
a. A Single-Factor 100%-Ownership Rule Enhances Predictability
Predictability requires a single-factor bright-line rule. Potential sur-
prises deter tribal economic development by rendering the parties' lia-
bility for future disputes unpredictable. Contrary to the assertion of
123. See, e.g., Note, The Decline of Tribal Sovereignty: The Journey From Dicta to Dogma in
Duro v. Reina, 66 WASH. L. REV. 567, 567-68 (1991).
124. Eg., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 25.00 (Supp. 1980). A prevalent argument
for abolishing tribal immunity is the continuing decline in state and federal government
immunities. Some contend there is no reason tribal immunity should not follow suit. See
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe 111 S. Ct. 905, 912 (1991)
(Stevens, J., concurring); Note, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Searchirg for Sensible Limits, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 173 (1988).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
126. See Pommersheim, supra note 9, at 202-05 (impediments to tribal progress include
jurisdictional uncertainty).
127. See Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 160 Ariz. 251, 772 P.2d 1104 (1989) (considering four
factors); F. COHEN, supra note 19, at 327 (suggesting that tribal purpose and majority ownership
should determine tribal immunity); Note, supra note 124, at 174-80 (arguing that immunity
should only apply to actions that directly threaten a tribe's internal governmental powers).
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some tribal immunity opponents, it is unpredictability, not the mere
existence of tribal immunity, that deters tribal economic develop-
ment.' 28 Predictability can be advanced and sovereignty and self-
determination protected with a rule limiting immunity to wholly
owned tribal enterprises. Under this standard any subordinate entity
would enjoy immunity so long as the tribe was the sole owner. The
legal form of the entity, whether agency, corporation, or sole proprie-
torship, would be irrelevant to the immunity determination.' 29
One-hundred percent tribal ownership is also more readily ascer-
tainable than some other limit, such as a majority-ownership rule. 3 '
Similarly, a multifactor balancing approach like that of Dixon"'3 is
undesirable because it is largely unpredictable before litigation.'32 The
outcome of a one-hundred percent ownership rule is relatively easy to
predict prior to litigation. Persons dealing with tribes would only need
evidence of some non-tribal share to determine that the entity was not
entitled to immunity.'33 Accordingly, the proposed rule promotes tri-
128. Tribal immunity opponents commonly argue that the doctrine discourages economic
development. See ag., Dixon, 772 P.2d at 1112. Some contend that tribal immunity "chills"
business development because entrepreneurs are reluctant to deal with tribes knowing they might
have no recourse to the tribe's assets. See, eg., id. This "chilling" argument ignores one of the
doctrine's fundamental facets-the possibility of immunity waivers. Tribes are competent to
negotiate waivers of their immunity and presumably will do so when in their best interest. See,
ag., McClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1989); see also supra notes 72-79
and accompanying text. Businesses are, or should be, aware of tribal immunity and likely will
insist on a waiver. See, eg., id. at 631-32.
Even if the tribe refuses to waive immunity, an entrepreneur may decide the venture is
profitable enough to justify accepting the risk of loss from tribal immunity. Consequently,
abolition of tribal immunity in the name of promoting tribal business is unnecessarily
paternalistic.
129. Disregarding legal form for immunity purposes is consistent with the approach of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603 (West 1973).
130. The Handbook of Federal Indian Law suggests that the percentage of tribal ownership
may be relevant to determining immunity. F. COHEN, supra note 19, at 327.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
132. In 1978 the United Kingdom abolished a "control" test, similar to the Dixon approach,
for limiting foreign sovereign immunity because that test was "unwieldy and unpredictable." See
Hoffman, The Separate Entity Rule in International Perspective: Should State Ownership of
Corporate Shares Confer Sovereign Status for Immunity Purposes?, 65 TUL. L. REv. 535, 551-54
(1991).
A line of Arizona cases illustrates the arbitrary nature of the multifactor approach. Compare
White Mountain Apache Indian Tribe v. Shelley, 107 Ariz. 4, 480 P.2d 654 (1971) (timber
company immune from suit) and South Unique, Ltd. v. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian
Community, 138 Ariz. 378, 674 P.2d 1376 (Ct. App. 1983) (farming corporation immune from
suit) with Dixon v. Picopa Constr. Co., 160 Ariz. 251, 772 P.2d 1104 (1989) (construction
company not immune from suit).
133. This observation assumes that tribal-owned corporations are closely held. If shares were
easily transferable, outsiders could manipulate and destroy tribal immunity.
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bal economic development by better defining the risk of doing business
with a tribe.
b. The 100%-Ownership Rule Ensures Tribal Purpose and Control
The wholly-owned rule obviates the need to consider other factors.
Wholly-owned tribal entities should be presumed to function with a
tribal purpose and under tribal control. In the context of state, fed-
eral, and foreign sovereign immunities, distinctions are sometimes
drawn between actions by government agencies and government-
owned corporations or between "sovereign" and "commercial" activ-
ity.13 4 In some contexts, immunity may be confined to certain govern-
mental organs or to "sovereign" activities. 13
5
Such governmental/proprietary distinctions are inappropriate in the
tribal context.1 36  Tribes traditionally take a more communal
approach to developing community resources than federal or state
governments. 137  In light of pervasive poverty, unemployment and
limited financial resources, every tribal-owned enterprise is de facto
formed for tribal purposes. Similarly, tribes should be presumed to
control any wholly-owned entity. The proposed one-hundred percent
ownership rule would constrict tribal sovereignty and self-determina-
tion by requiring a sacrifice of immunity in return for acceptance of
outside ownership. However, cases like Dixon show that tribal sover-
eignty and self-determination may be effectively ignored when the
breadth of immunity is left to the discretion of another sovereign's
courts. Should Congress enact the one-hundred percent ownership
rule, the decision to forego immunity in favor of outside investment is
left entirely to the tribe.
The one-hundred percent ownership rule recognizes a tribal immu-
nity somewhat broader than federal and state sovereign immunities."3 '
Given the limited resources of tribes this additional protection is war-
ranted.3 9 The one-hundred percent ownership rule is a fair compro-
134. See Hoffman, supra note 132, at 542-49.
135. See idL
136. Eg., United Nuclear Corp. v. Clark, 584 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D.D.C. 1984) (no court has
held that immunity is limited to traditional "governmental" actions).
137. See Pommersheim, supra note 9, at 215-16.
138. State-owned corporations are not immune from suit under the eleventh amendment.
Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1 824). Generally, federal-
owned corporations also are not immune from suit. Eg., Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States
Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 565-67 (1922). However, foreign states,
under the FSIA, have a somewhat broader immunity that covers their majority owned
subordinate entities. See Hoffman, supra note 132, at 539.
139. Note, In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1058 (1982).
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mise between tribal sovereignty and self-determination on the one
hand and predictability on the other.
2. Immunity Should Extend to Off-Reservation Activity
Once the form of tribal entity entitled to immunity has been defined,
a comprehensive statute should spell out whether its activities are
immune from suit when conducted off-reservation. Tribal sovereignty
and congressional plenary power dictate that tribal immunity should
extend to off-reservation activity unless Congress expressly subjects
tribes to such suits."4 Self-determination and practical considerations
also support this conclusion.
a. Self-Determination Supports Off-Reservation Immunity
Congressional self-determination policies14 1 implicitly support tribal
immunity for off-reservation activity. Congress envisioned that the
economic development necessary for effective tribal self-determination
would involve off-reservation commercial activity.142 Nonetheless,
although Congress was likely aware that such off-reservation conduct
might involve tribal immunity, the legislators have not confined
immunity to reservation boundaries.143 Instead, Congress has largely
left tribal immunity to the tribes to invoke or waive in their discre-
tion. 1" Consequently, a rule limiting tribal immunity to reservation
boundaries would frustrate federal self-determination policy by forcing
tribes to either forego attractive off-reservation financial opportunities
or forego their immunity.
b. Practical Considerations Support Off-Reservation Immunity
A rule preserving off-reservation immunity should not ignore practi-
cal factors.1 45 For example, many reservations have very little land. 146
On the smallest of these reservations some roads may frequently weave
in and out of reservation land. Liability for an auto accident involving
140. See supra notes 80-83 and 115-18 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
142. Cf Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 162 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
143. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 111 S. Ct. 905,
910 (1991).
144. See, eg., 25 U.S.C.A. § 450n (West 1983).
145. "There is no magic in the word 'reservation.'" Mescalero Apache, 411 U.S. at 161
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
146. Reservation land areas range from the massive 15 million acre Navajo Reservation to the
33,242 acre Turtle Mountain Reservation. P. STUART, NATIONS WITHIN A NATION:
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF AMERICAN INDIANS 33 (1987). Additionally, limited populations
mean that many reservations have limited potential for economic development.
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a tribal vehicle should not depend on whether it occurred immediately
inside or just outside the reservation boundary. Similarly, modem tri-
bal business deals often have connections to multiple locales. A strict
geographic limitation for tribal immunity means that tribal liability for
contract disputes could turn on the coincidental and unpredictable cir-
cumstances surrounding business negotiations. A rule strictly limiting
tribal immunity to reservation boundaries thus unnecessarily compli-
cates tribal business deals.
IV. CONCLUSION
Tribal sovereignty and self-determination are crucially important to
tribes as they struggle to end years of unwanted domination. Tribal
immunity promotes sovereignty and self-determination by preventing
the unconsented interference of an outside sovereign in tribal affairs.
Tribal immunity merely places tribes on the same plateau as other
sovereigns.
To ensure continued respect for tribal sovereignty and self-determi-
nation, common law tribal immunity should be affirmed and deline-
ated in a federal statute. A well-drafted comprehensive statute will
prevent future anomalous decisions like Dixon and Padilla that
infringe upon tribal sovereignty and self-determiation. A precise
statute will also make tribal immunity more predictable thus advanc-
ing tribal business prosperity and tribal sovereignty.
Steve E. Dietrich
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